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JUVENILE JUSTICE CAUGHT BETWEEN
THE EXORCIST AND A CLOCKWORK ORANGE
Jane Rutherford
INTRODUCTION
Children are increasingly being tried as adults and sent to adult pris-
ons. This trend is both punitive and cynical. Age no longer seems to
be a measure of how guileless or immature a child is. Instead, age is
seen as a subterfuge for malicious behavior. As the boundary be-
tween adults and children is pushed to ever younger ages, we are vir-
tually eradicating the concept of adolescence. Ironically, this shift is
occurring just as new neuroscience research is demonstrating remark-
able differences between adolescent and adult brains.
The drive to treat adolescent offenders as if they were adults comes
from a punitive model of juvenile justice that sees deviant children as
bad, perhaps even evil, like the protagonist in the 1973 film The Exor-
cist.1 In that movie, the adolescent girl is literally possessed by the
devil. Although Satan is an uninvited guest, he manages to control
the child so that she cannot resist violent impulses. Her parents are as
powerless to correct her behavior as she is. Nevertheless, she poses a
threat to herself and others that must be contained. Fortunately for
her, the priest's exorcism is successful. Otherwise, her parents might
have been tempted to "beat the devil out of her. '' 2 No one suspects
that the girl will outgrow her problems or that they can be solved by
changing environmental conditions. Similar concerns motivate the
punitive model of juvenile justice that sees adolescent offenders as
indistinguishable from older criminals who need to be punished, not
coddled.
Neuroscience data, however, suggests that there are developmental
differences in the brain's biochemistry and anatomy that may limit
adolescents' ability to perceive risks, control impulses, understand
consequences, and control emotions.3 Therefore, adolescents may be
more prone to emotional outbursts and even violence. These differ-
1. THE EXORCIST (Warner Bros. 1973).
2. Id.
3. See Francis J. Lexcon & Dickon Repuci, Effects of Psychopathology on Adolescent Medical
Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 63, 77-78 (1998).
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ences are exacerbated by psychosocial conditions that render youth
more susceptible to peer influences and less likely to be deterred by
consequences. 4 Finally, because the brain is "plastic,"'5 environment
influences how individuals perceive and respond to stimuli.6 For ex-
ample, children who have been exposed to more fear and violence
may develop biochemical responses that are more likely to result in
aggression. 7 If correct, that data raises new hopes and fears: It pro-
vides hope that age and appropriate conditioning could help change
violent offenders; but it raises the specter of government mind con-
trol, as in the 1971 film A Clockwork Orange.8
In the Exorcist, Linda Blair is an unwilling victim of Satan. In con-
trast, A Clockwork Orange portrays violent punks who enjoy wreak-
ing havoc. They exploit a permissive environment by preying on
others as a form of thrill-seeking, inflicting pain, and demolishing
property for sheer fun and comradery. In the film, society responds
with intensive behavior therapy and mind-altering drugs to completely
transform the punks into different people with more mainstream val-
ues. The movie is a classic because it evokes disgust both for the
punks' senseless mayhem and for the invasive process of transforming
them. The underlying view of deviant teens as products of their own
bad values, permissive parents, and toxic culture motivates what I call
the assimilative model of juvenile justice. The assimilative model is
less ambivalent than A Clockwork Orange, however, because it cele-
brates the possibility that the government could alter the minds of
deviant adolescents.
The current trend to use a punitive approach reflects the public fear
of violent juvenile crime coupled with skepticism about the courts'
capacity to reform delinquents. The assimilative model appeals to
some of the same interests when it blames bad moms, toxic culture,
and bad kids; hence, it may become more popular if the new neuros-
cience data can reassure the public that delinquents really can be
transformed. Currently, courts continue to be reluctant to forcibly ad-
minister psychotropic drugs, 9 but that distaste may diminish as more
4. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective of Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 171 (1997).
5. Changing according to circumstances. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Brain Plasticity And Spanish
Moss in Biological Analysis. 53 FLA. L. REV. 905, 916 (2001).
6. See Owen 0. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Low's Leverage Behavioral
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 N.W.U. L. REV. 1141, 1164-65 (2001).
7. See Maureen P. Coffey, Note: The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation? 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 353, 399 n.l 1 (1993).
8. A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Bros. 1971).
9. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992). But see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210. 247 (1980).
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juveniles are imprisoned for life or executed. If so, A Clockwork Or-
ange may become prophetic.
Between these two extremes are several other approaches: the re-
habilitative model, the restorative model, and the preventive or social
control model. All of these theories of juvenile justice start with a set
of precepts about appropriate behavior and then try to mold adoles-
cents to conform to such behavior. Without much empirical informa-
tion about the nature of adolescence, psychological, social, or
developmental data are used only to reinforce the image of delin-
quents as inherently dangerous or to design ways to transform them.
Whatever we learn about adolescent development is interpreted in
light of these goals.
Each of the current models of juvenile justice distorts the defini-
tions of capacity and maturity for various religious, cultural, and social
reasons. Therefore, merely paying more attention to empirical data
will not fully solve the problem because the data itself is likely to be
interpreted in light of various cultural biases. Increased attention to
the developmental data is necessary, but it will only help if it is used in
ways that are less hostile to adolescents.
Therefore, I propose a shift in the underlying rationale for juvenile
justice. The primary goal of juvenile justice should be to maximize the
communal investment in the next generation. Techniques drawn from
the current models would be applied only to the extent that they fur-
ther that goal. Thus, punishment might be used only if it is the best
way to help an offender develop necessary skills like impulse control.
One consequence of a communal investment theory is that interven-
tions would have to be based upon empirically demonstrated effec-
tiveness. For example, if incarceration increases recidivism rates, it
could no longer be justified. Insisting upon effective communal in-
vestment simultaneously protects the adolescents' future and public
safety.
II. FIVE MODELS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Currently, there seem to be at least five models of juvenile justice:
punitive, rehabilitative, restorative, assimilative, and preventive. All
five models can be illustrated with the plot of a movie, television
show, or book. The Exorcist suggests the punitive model (which views
children as inherently bad), while A Clockwork Orange documents
the assimilative model (which sees a bad culture enabling bad kids,
coming from bad homes, who make bad choices). Similarly, the 1938
2002]
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film Boys' Town' 0 captures the ethos of the rehabilitative model.
Here, deviant boys are innocent victims of either absent or bad par-
ents. These poor orphans need only to be taught how to choose good
over evil, a process that is heart-warmingly easy in the supportive at-
mosphere provided by the kind priests who run the fancy orphanage
in which the boys live. Although both the rehabilitative model and
the assimilative model seek to reform deviant teens, the rehabilitative
model focuses its blame only on the parents, while the assimilative
model blames bad parents, bad kids, and a toxic culture. The punitive,
rehabilitative, and assimilative models all assign blame and character-
ize teen deviance as "bad" behavior, rather than a normal part of the
developmental process.
In contrast, the restorative model sees adolescent deviance as an
unfortunate part of normal development, much like the temper tan-
trums thrown by toddlers. Not surprisingly, this tolerant restorative
model is most frequently practiced in close-knit communities. The
goal is to restore a strong sense of community by reconciling the vic-
tim and the perpetrator. In the United States, the restorative model
of juvenile justice most frequently has been practiced within tradi-
tional middle-class families; so it is the standard fare of television
sitcoms like Leave it to Beaver, Happy Days, and The Cosby Show. In
the classic case, a small child steals a candy bar and the wise parent
makes the child return to the store, admit the theft to the manager,
and offer to "work off the debt" by sweeping up for a week. The store
manager who knows his role is appropriately stern but ultimately re-
wards the child's hard work and honesty at the end of the week. In
the happy denouement, the storekeeper explains how theft takes food
off of his table and drives up prices for everyone else. Then he gives
the child a candy bar because the child has "earned" it. Unlike the
adolescents in The Exorcist or A Clockwork Orange who terrify the
adults around them, the children in Leave it to Beaver, The Cosby
Show, and Boys' Town are cute and wholesome. Adults are bemused
by their understandable foibles, not frightened by them.
The final approach to juvenile justice is the preventive model, which
is actually a form of social control more reminiscent of the novels
1984 1 and A Brave New World.' 2 Unlike the other theories that focus
on individual deviance, the preventive model focuses on entire popu-
lations. In 1984 and A Brave New World, crime rarely occurs because
the entire environment is so carefully controlled and supervised that
10. Boys' TOWN (Warner Bros. 1938).
I1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1949).
12. ALlOUs HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper & Row 1932).
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the opportunity to offend never arises. Constant surveillance by "Big
Brother"'13 or suitable distractions like "the feelies"' 14 keep adoles-
cents safely occupied. The social control approach does not attempt
to punish, rehabilitate, restore, or assimilate any particular child. The
model looks to population-wide remedies instead. For example, con-
sider the problem of graffiti. The first step for the other models of
juvenile justice would be to catch the tagger. Then, appropriate steps
would be taken to craft an individual remedy (i.e., place the offender
on probation or send him to scrub off the graffiti). In contrast, under
the social control model, access to spray paint would be restricted by a
ban on selling to minors. 15 Increasingly, communities are applying the
social control model with rules like curfews, restricted sales to minors,
graduated drivers' licenses, generalized drug testing, and even preven-
tive detention. The following sections will examine several of the
above models in more detail.
A. The Punitive Model
The punitive model of juvenile justice sees bad children as the
source of the delinquency, so it focuses on punishment and retribution
both to deter bad behavior and to provide justice to the victims. This
model has strong religious and cultural roots that are captured in films
like The Exorcist.
The Exorcist is only one example in a string of films that represent
children and adolescents as inherently evil or possessed by the devil. 16
This view of children as little beasts who must be tamed either by their
parents or by society has a long history. Religiously, the antecedents
are in the notions of original sin, predestination, 17 and retribution.
Predestination was a central tenet of the Calvinists, who were very
influential in the development of American law.' 8 For Calvinists, chil-
dren (like adults) are predestined to do God's will, and neither age
nor parental influences can change the outcome. 19 Some individuals
are believed to be granted God's grace and others are believed to be
13. See generally, ORWELL, supra note 11.
14. See generally, HUXLEY, supra note 12.
15. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 8-16-096 (1990).
16. See, e.g., CHILDREN OF THE CORN (Studio New World, t984); DAMIEN-OMEN 11 (20th
Century Fox, 1978); THE BAD SEED (Warner Bros., 1956); THE OMEN (20th Century Fox. 1976);
VILLAGE OF THE DAMNED (MGM, 1960).
17. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations
of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1197-98 (1998).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1197-98.
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condemned to eternal suffering. 20 Thus, the nature of misbehaving
children and delinquent juveniles is predestined. 2' The result of this
belief is a view of children as immutably damaged with little prospect
for change. 22 The best that can be hoped is that external efforts will
control inherently disruptive and violent natures.
The Protestant ethic combined notions of predestination with a
strong work ethic. 23 Because hard work could generate wealth in
some cases, wealth came to be seen as evidence of diligence. 24 Con-
versely, poverty came to be associated with shiftlessness. 25 Conse-
quently, some Calvinists believe that evidence of God's grace may be
reflected in the wealth and status of the individual. 26 Hence, poor
children may have been purposely cast out from the possibility of
heaven. Conveniently, these notions connecting wealth and status to
God's grace could be used to explain and justify slavery, racism, and
distinctions based on social class. 27
This view of inherently evil children is not a relic of our distant past.
Dramatic evidence exists of widespread demonization of children, 28
particularly adolescent males2 9 who are often referred to as "super-
predators," "monsters," or "gang-bangers." Not surprisingly, these
characterizations are most likely to be made about children who are
resisting dominant cultural norms. 30 A number of terms, like "super-
20. Id. at 1197.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Leonard, supra note 17, at 1198.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1194; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 161-
63 (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1958).
27. See Alfreda A. Sellers-Diamond, Disposable Children in Black Faces: The Violence Initia-
tive as Inner-City Containment Policy, 62 UMKC L. REV. 423, 446 (1994); Leonard, supra note
17. at 1194.
28. See, e.g., PETER ELIKANN, SUPER-PRIEDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN
BY THE LAW (1999); Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 757
(1992) (referring to "all newborn babies" as "squalling little monsters of domination and uncon-
trollability"); Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the
Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court. 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (2000); MIKE A. MALES,
FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS AIouT THE NEXT GENERATION (1999); MIKE A. MALES, THE
SCAPEGOAr GENERATION: AMERICA'S WAR ON ADOLESCENTS (1996).
29. For example, the value of wrongful death awards for children is tied to age, race, and
gender. Although the verdicts for the death of a white male infant are relatively high, they
decline dramatically at adolescence.
30. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court
Processing: Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, in READINGS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION 78 (Barry C. Feld ed., 1999) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE] (stating "This
pattern is consistent with the idea that underclass black males are viewed as a threatening group
to middle-class populations and thus will be subjected to increased formal social control by the
[Vol. 51:715
2002] JUVENILE JUSTICE 721
predator" or "gang-banger," carry silent, racially charged messages.
For example, even when juvenile crime was declining, the media con-
tinued to characterize some of our children as "super-predators." 31
Although this term is rarely precisely defined, it is generally applied to
minority youth accused of violent crimes.32 It is not reserved for re-
peat offenders, gang members, or older adolescents. Thus, the white
high school seniors at Columbine High School who had prior criminal
contacts for theft, vandalism, and hate crimes were not described as
"super-predators." Similarly, "gang-bangers" are almost always per-
ceived to be Hispanic or black males. Hence, when a group of teen-
age white girls repeatedly held up convenience stores at gunpoint, the
news coverage went out of its way to make the girls seem similar to
other middle-class teens. The clique was never referred to as a gang
nor were the girls ever called gang-bangers.
Changing the label from "delinquent" to "super-predator" or
"gang-banger" has serious consequences. Once youths accused of
crimes are labeled as dangerous outsiders, it is easier to adopt a puni-
tive approach in order to protect the public. 33 Although causal links
are difficult to demonstrate, at least one possible consequence is that
African-Americans, Latinos, and some recent immigrants like the
Hmong see ever increasing numbers of their young transferred to
adult criminal courts, incarcerated, and even sentenced to death. 34
For example in 1997, 37.5% of the offenders incarcerated in juvenile
juvenile justice system.") Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95
(1993) (discussing the role that resistance plays in criminal behavior); Sampson & Laub. supra, at
69 (suggesting that the middle-class white view of non-white youth as aggressive, sexual, and
undisciplined accounts for racial disparities in the juvenile justice system).
31. The word "super-predator" was coined by the conservative criminologist, John Dilulio.
See, JOHN DIIULIO ET AL., BooY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY ... AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S
WAR AGAINST CRIME & DRUGS 27 (1996).
32. A quick check of Westlaw news sources found seventy-three references to super predators
in the last two years. The vast majority of them referred to either African-American or Hispanic
youths.
33. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELl, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 6 (1999)
34. Documenting the breakdowns among relevant populations is difficult because the statis-
tics lump various groups together. See, e.g., JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES
AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 1018-19 (2000) (noting that crime statistics almost
always focus on a black/white dichotomy, clumping other diverse groups together); D. Marvin
Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 499 (1993)
(suggesting that Americans stereotype criminals as black and victims as white). It seems clear
that race plays a significant role in determining how youth accused of crimes are treated. See
Marcy Rasmussen Podkopaczz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Waiver, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 184, 189 (stating, "Although about one-third (34%) of the
arrests for violent crimes involved white juveniles, less than one-fifth (19%) of the violent of-
fenders against whom prosecutors filed reference motions were white.").
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facilities were African-American, 18.5 % were Hispanic, 1.5% were
American Indian, 1.8% were Asian, and .03% were Pacific Island-
ers. 35 The numbers are even more dramatic for those transferred to
adult court. Thus, although blacks account for only 26% of youths
arrested, they are 46% of those waived to adult criminal court.36 The
differences cannot be explained by the nature of the offenses commit-
ted. For instance, African-American juveniles are forty-eight times
more likely to be incarcerated for drug offenses than white juveniles.37
For violent crimes, white youths serve the shortest sentences (193
days), blacks serve almost 24% longer (254 days), and undifferenti-
ated Hispanics serve the longest time (305 days or 37% longer than
whites). 38
Preconceived stereotypes of poor children as immutably lazy and
predisposed to violence marked some children as outcasts and social
deviants from birth. Thus, white supremacy was given a biological, as
well as a religious and cultural imprimatur. Scientific theories were
developed, tested, and interpreted in light of this religious and cultural
preference for predestination. Thus, Darwin's theory of evolution and
survival of the fittest was used to justify white supremacy, 39 and bio-
determinists quickly focused on the brain.40 First came the phrenolo-
gists who claimed that they could discover the keys to human charac-
ter, personality, behavior, and intelligence by examining the size and
shape of bumps on individuals' heads.41 Then Darwin suggested that
it might be wise if revered individuals were encouraged to increase
their family size. 42 Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, extended this
idea to propose that human breeding was a solution to the crime prob-
lem, and the eugenics movement was born.43 Positive eugenics, which
encouraged reproduction of the elite, quickly devolved into negative
eugenics, which suggested limiting reproduction of undesirables, and
ultimately it developed into genocide. 44 Although Nazi excesses cast
35. Catherine A. Gallagher, Juvenile Offenders in Residential Placement, 1997, at http://www.
ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/fs996.txt (visited April 26, 2000).
36. Fox Butterfield, Racial Disparities Seen as Pervasive in Juvenile Justice, N. Y. TIMES, April
26, 2000, at 1, 19.
37. Id. at Al.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bernier, Class, Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Sociopo-
litical Choices, II HARV. BLACKLFrER L.J. 115, 129 (1994); lan F. Hanley-Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994)
40. Hanley-Lopez, supra note 39, at 15.
41. See DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 6-8 (1999).
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 10.
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considerable disfavor on the eugenics movement, the faith in genetics
as an explanation for deviance has survived the war. 45 Thus, in 1949,
the Nobel Prize for Medicine was awarded to Egas Moniz for his de-
velopment of a "surgical solution to violence" that consisted of re-
moving a portion of the brains of violent individuals. 46 Such an
invasive "solution" just a few years after the holocaust demonstrates
how strongly religious and cultural ideas influence the way we view
science.
These eugenic ideas fit comfortably into preconceived notions of
white supremacy and God-given affluence. The belief in predestina-
tion paved the way for those who use science to argue that behavior is
genetically influenced, if not controlled. 47 It was a short step for some
to then argue that behavior is not only genetically programmed but
also racially linked. 48 For example, in 1992, Dr. Frederick Goodwin 49
called for a "Violence Initiative" to study violence in the inner cities. 50
In choosing to focus on children of the inner city, Dr. Goodwin sug-
gested the following: that violence had a genetic component; some in-
dividuals were more vulnerable to violent impulses; these individuals
could be identified at a young age; and such vulnerability might be
traced to inferior social structures, so that "maybe it isn't just careless
use of the word when people call certain areas of certain cities jun-
gles."51 He also referred to male monkeys who were both hyper-ag-
gressive and hypersexual. 52 Dr. Goodwin's racist language reveals the
extent to which old religious and scientific ideas continue to taint how
we interpret new data. It also suggests how strongly youth crime has
become a silent icon for racially charged thinking.
Implicit in this approach is a conviction that it is "nature" not nur-
ture that determines both individual and collective character and be-
havior. Nature is inborn and can be influenced but not changed.
45. Id. at 21.
46. See NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 21.
47. See, e.g., Patricia A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive Behaviour, Mental Sub-normality and the
XYY Male, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965); R. KOTULAK, INSIDE THE BRAIN: REVOLUTIONARY DIS-
COVERIES OF HOW THE MIND WORKS 3-4 (1996); VERNON H. MARK & FRANK R. ERVIN, VIO-
LENCE AND THE BRAIN 138-44 (1970); NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 5-27 (1999) (recounting the
history of genetic accounts of violence).
48. See, e.g., RICHARD HERSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 298-315 (1994);
ARTHUR R. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING 58 (1980).
49. Dr. Frederick Goodwin was then the director of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration. Sellers-Diamond, supra note 27, at 423.
50. Id.
51. NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 2; Sellers-Diamond, supra note 27, at 449.
52. Sellers-Diamond, supra note 27, at 445.
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Biological determinism obviously marginalizes groups that are defined
by their phenotypes like race, gender, and ethnicity.
1. Punishment as a Pillar of Hierarchy
Indeed, a punitive model of juvenile justice is part of the foundation
of a hierarchal society. It supports existing power structures within
both the family and the polity. Rebellious young dissenters can read-
ily be discarded, even incarcerated, or worse for challenging existing
authority. This notion of filial obedience has ancient religious roots.53
Defiance demands punishment as a sin against authority.
Although theoretically not punitive, juvenile courts stepped in to
punish disobedient children, often incarcerating them for "incorrigi-
ble" behavior by acting under statutes that granted the juvenile court
jurisdiction of non-offending adolescents who are "in need of supervi-
sion."' 54 These vague categories permitted parents to call the police or
petition the courts to get help enforcing parental commands. Al-
though incarceration for these status offenses theoretically is no
longer permitted, 55 the practice continues in other guises, such as
sentences for contempt of court. 56 The way it works is that a father
calls the police because his son or, more typically, his daughter has run
away. At a subsequent juvenile court hearing, the court may enter an
order directing the child to obey her father or to remain in the family
53. See, e.g., Irene Marker Rosenberg et al., Return of the Stubborn & Rebellious Son: An
Independent Sequel on the Prediction of Future Criminality, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 511, 511-12 (1998-
99). Stating,
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken to the voice of his
father, or the voice of his mother, and though they chasten him, will not hearken unto
them; then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the
elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; and they shall say unto the elders of his
city: "This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he doth not hearken to our voice; he is a
glutton, and a drunkard." And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that
he die; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee; and all Israel shall hear,
and fear.
Id. (citing Deuteronomy 21:18-21).
54. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(12)(A) (1988) (stating, "[J]uveniles who are charged with or who
have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult or offenses which
do not constitute violations of valid court orders . . . shall not be placed in secure detention
facilities or secure correctional facilities .... ").
56. See, e.g., Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: At-
tempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C. R-CL. L.
REv. 41, 42 (1981); Cheryl Dalby, Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A Paternalistic Agenda
Carried Out Through the JJDPA, 12 LAW & INEQ. 429, 441 (1994).
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home. If the child runs away again, the child may then be incarcer-
ated for contempt of court.57
These provisions are used disproportionately to incarcerate teenage
girls who violate sexual taboos or exercise too much independence. 58
Hence, females who stay out all night are more likely to be considered
runaways and are more often incarcerated than male runaways. 59 Ad-
ditionally, over one third of all juvenile complaints against girls in-
volve status offenses. 60  Indeed, girls currently receive longer
sentences in more secure facilities than boys arrested for comparable
offenses, even though girls are substantially less likely to be violent or
to be recidivists. 61 Not surprisingly, this gender bias fits easily with
religious and cultural notions that require girls to be more subservient,
chaste, and compliant than boys. Hence, the penal structure supports
gender hierarchy as well.
A punitive juvenile justice system also contributes to complex eco-
nomic and social structures that preserve race and class privileges.
For example, the United States incarcerates more individuals than al-
most any other country in the world. Consequently, in the 1990s while
other industrialized nations were struggling with unemployment
problems and recession, the United States economy was booming with
record low unemployment rates. If, however, the nonviolent offend-
ers had been released from prison, the unemployment rates would
have soared. As these individuals competed for jobs, wages for work-
ers may have declined, thus reducing purchasing power and possibly
slowing the economy. In sum, incarcerating young people enables the
economy to artificially reduce unemployment, keeping economic in-
dicators healthy and stock prices high.
Moreover, those incarcerated are disproportionately black or La-
tino, both when compared to the overall population and when com-
pared to the delinquent population by offense and criminal history.62
In contrast, I suspect that those who benefit from higher stock prices
are disproportionately wealthier and whiter than the general popula-
tion. Indeed in the 1990s, a decade that substantially increased puni-
57. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39G(c) (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169 -D:17(V)(c) (1990).
58. See e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice Process-
ing: Implications of the JJDP Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY , 1162, 1163 (1992); Dalby,
supra note 56, at 445.
59. Dalby, supra note 56, at 445-46.
60. Status offenses are activities that are not criminal for adults. Id. at 446.
61. Martha Neil, Gender Affects Justice: Girls Face Tough Treatment for Criminal Activity, 87
A.B.A. J. 77 (Jul. 2001).
62. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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tive measures, the gap between the rich and the poor in the United
States reached its all time high.
My claim is not that a punitive model of juvenile justice caused this
gap, but rather that it was one factor among many that contributed to
it. The juvenile justice system has less impact on these economic
structures than other factors. Nevertheless, one consequence of the
emphasis on punishment has been to transform juvenile offenders into
adult criminals, thereby increasing the possible length of their
sentences and keeping them out of the workforce for longer periods of
time. Moreover, incarcerated youth may not be as competitive on the
job market when they are released because they have not necessarily
been learning the skills nor making the contacts they need for the
working world. Hence, incarcerating disproportionate numbers of
outsider youths increases the competitive advantages of others.
2. Protecting Society
Despite these problems, the punitive system may seem necessary in
order to protect society from youth violence. Indeed, all too often the
victims of youth violence are also children. The clamor for punish-
ment seems strongest for the most seriously violent crimes, while
other responses seem unfair to the victim. If one teen kills another
and is sent to an anger management program, it seems to be a slap on
the wrist that devalues the life of the victim. Moreover, if the result
seems unfair to other adolescents in the community, they may feel less
bound by the rules because the rules are unfair and they carry no con-
sequences. Hence, theoretically, punishment both deters violence and
displaces self-help retribution.
It is not clear, however, whether these claims can be empirically
demonstrated. In the 1990s, most juvenile crime declined but violent
crime rose. The punitive approach did not seem to have much deter-
rent effect on the most serious crime. Similarly, with the punitive
measures still in place, overall juvenile crime is on the rise again.
3. Deterrence & Neuroscience
Three principles from the new neuroscience research may help ex-
plain why it is so hard to deter adolescent violence. First, the
prefrontal lobe of the brain that mediates emotional impulses gener-
ated by the amygdala does not fully develop until sometime between
the ages of twenty-five and thirty.63 The development is not like a
63. See Lisette Blumhardt, In the Best Interest of the Child: Juvenile Justice or Adult Retribu-
tion? 23 U. HAW. L. RE-v. 341, 353 (2000) (citing National Public Radio, Gray Matters: The
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toggle switch that turns on or off at a particular age; rather, it is a
gradual process. To the extent that the prefrontal lobe operates like
the brakes on a car, most adolescents would be driving cars with very
thin brake shoes. It is not that the entire mechanism is missing, but
that it is not operating at full strength. How effective such weak
brakes are depends upon how suddenly the car needs to stop. The
faster the car is going and the closer it is to the object to be avoided,
the harder it will be to stop.
Second, social factors like a teen's sense of status and his prior ex-
perience with violence are most likely to determine the strength of the
aggressive impulse. 64 If the teen perceives a situation to be threaten-
ing, it is likely to trigger a fear response. This fear is what determines
the speed of the car. The more threatened the teen feels, the harder it
will be to put on the brakes. Although what threatens the teen is so-
cially determined, there are biochemical responses associated with
feelings of threat.
Third, the brain is plastic. In order to enable individuals to adapt to
changing conditions but still learn from their experiences, the brain is
constantly changing its biochemistry and, in some cases, even its anat-
omy in response to changes in the environment. 65 The more often an
experience is repeated, the faster the brain responds; this is why, for
example, parents nag their children to practice the piano and do their
homework. Therefore, prior exposure to violence is likely to increase
the sense of threat. Just as battered women become hypervigilant,
aware of every slight detail that might indicate an imminent attack,66
teens who have been exposed to violence are more likely to read an
interaction as threatening. A sense of threat triggers a fight or flight
response, but because the prefrontal lobe is not fully developed, it
cannot fully moderate that strong emotional response. 67 Hence, most
adolescent violence is reactive.
This data explains commonly observed teen behavior, as well as va-
riance among the teen population. Because the prefrontal lobe is not
fully mature, teens are almost inevitably overly emotional and subject
to wide mood swings. Because the brakes do not work well on the
Teenage Brain (Feb. 9, 2000) (featuring Dr. Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Ph.D., Director of Neuro-
psychology and Cognitive Neuroimaging at McLean Brain Imaging Center)).
64. C. Antoinette Clark, Law and Order On the Courts: The Application of Criminal Liability
for Intentional Fouls During Sporting Events, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1149, 1159 (2000).
65. See Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science Synchronicity, and
the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 966 (1994).
66. See, e.g., Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome & Self Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 324 (1992).
67. Blumhardt, supra note 63, at 353.
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car, they are always going too fast or too slow. If a teen has had rela-
tively little experience with violence, she is less likely to read social
cues as threatening (perhaps naively so) thereby putting less strain on
her prefrontal lobe. As a result, she will be more able to control her
impulses. However, if a teen has had a number of violent experiences,
he is likely to read cues as more threatening thereby putting a larger
strain on his immature prefrontal lobe. As a result, he is more likely
to react violently.
If most teen violence is reactive and based on a combination of bio-
logical and social interactions, then punishment cannot deter it. It is
the prefrontal lobe that processes the concept of consequences and
predicts risk. Because that portion of the brain is immature, increas-
ing the punishment will have little effect. When the threat over-
whelms the prefrontal lobe's capacity to mitigate it, the nature of the
punishment is irrelevant. Hence, it is no surprise that increased pun-
ishments had no effect on the escalating violent crime of the 1990s.
In contrast, however, other less serious juvenile crime may be more
deterrable. The car has brakes; they simply are not very good ones.
When teens have less emotional overload, they are more capable of
weighing the consequences. Hence, a teen shopping alone in a store
may be able to control her impulse to steal something more easily
than a six-year-old child could. However, even with property crimes,
the sense of status and threat can overcome the immature prefrontal
lobe. For example, when a group of teens go into a store and one
dares another to shoplift, the dare may create a social threat to status.
Once again, a sense of threat may diminish the teen's ability to control
her impulses. That fact explains why so much adolescent crime occurs
in groups or pairs. Teens are much more likely to break the law when
in the company of their friends.
Indeed, understanding that threats to social status trigger the
strongest feelings of aggression and depression also explains the pecu-
liarly strong effects of peer influence on teens. The data shows that
adolescents are far more concerned with how their peers perceive
them than either younger children or adults.68 Unfortunately, and
perhaps as a consequence, this is also the stage at which these peer
relationships seem most unstable.
4. Bullying
Read together, then, this data supports the emerging realization
that bullying has an enormous impact on adolescents and that the im-
68. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Lawrence Steinberg, The Cognative and Effective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEM. L. REV. 1763, 1775 (1995).
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pact is cumulative. Frequently, bullying is merely a euphemism for
actual physical violence and repeated harassment. Moreover, because
the threat is a loss of status, the bullying may be harmful even when it
is not violent. It might be argued that all children are bullied at some
point, so bullying fails to explain much. However, that claim fails to
account for the cumulative effects of bullying. Because of plasticity,
the more frequent the experience, the graver the harm. Also, because
of the powerful nature of violence as a force for conditioning the fight
or flight reflex, the more physically abusive the bullying, the more se-
rious the harm is. Finally, because the source of the problem is a loss
of status, it explains why hazing in fraternities may not create quite
the same effects. There, the hazing is a sort of welcoming rather than
a serious shaming. It also explains why the military academies haze
for a full year. Their purpose is to train individuals who will be willing
to fight. Given what we are learning about how the brain develops
and interacts with the environment, it is not so surprising to learn that
so many of those who are bullied lash out either by attempting suicide
or, more rarely, murder.
5. Culpability & Free Will: Excuses
Even if adolescents cannot be deterred, there might be an argument
for punishment as a form of just desserts. Justice might demand that a
proportional cost be imposed on the offender to offset the serious
harm to the victim. This theory has religious roots as well. 69 How-
ever, it also has pragmatic components because the risk of under-en-
forcement of crime is vigilantism. If we do not want other adolescents
retaliating, we need to provide an acceptable form of justice.
Nevertheless, the neuroscience and developmental data seem to
suggest that the "abuse excuse" may be genuine. Because the brain is
plastic, it constantly adapts so it can respond more quickly in the fu-
ture. Hence, children who have been exposed to violence have "prac-
ticed" their fight or flight response, will more easily perceive other's
behavior to be threatening, and feel that threat more strongly. It will
be harder for their immature prefrontal lobes to control these
stronger impulses. In essence, their ability to control their impulses in
these situations is more like the six-year-old child alone in the candy
store. Neither is culpable because neither is fully capable of control-
ling her impulses. 70
69. See e.g., Exodus 21:29 ("An eye for an eye ..
70. See e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581 (1994); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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Even the most punitive sense of justice acknowledges that there are
some individuals who are not responsible for their acts. For example,
a four-year-old child who finds a gun and kills his playmate is not
likely to be charged with a crime. The principle is that criminal culpa-
bility must be linked to the capacity to make a meaningful choice.
Hence, those who cannot tell right from wrong are not culpable, 7' and
those who are incapable of controlling their impulses are not
culpable. 72
Once again, the law has been strongly influenced by religion. Free
will is at the core of this heritage. Religiously, those who believe in
free will believe in the possibility of individual choice for good and
evil. Individuals are only morally culpable for their actions when they
have freely chosen them. Hence, the important question for children
is when free will emerges. Traditional Catholic doctrine held that suf-
ficient understanding arose to enable a child to exercise reason at the
age of seven, but that true free will that rendered a child fully culpable
did not emerge until a child was fourteen years old. Similarly, accord-
ing to Jewish tradition, a child becomes a religious adult at thirteen.
The Catholic theory was that at seven a child was able to reason well
enough to confess sins so that she could receive communion. At age
fourteen, she was mature enough to make a commitment to join the
church permanently and be confirmed in the faith if she had memo-
rized the catechism. Somewhat similarly, the Jewish tradition as-
sumed that at age thirteen a boy was both mature enough and well-
versed enough in the Torah to be counted as one of the minion, a
group of ten men necessary to hold services. Of course, memorizing
religious doctrine and learning to read and interpret Hebrew texts are
not measures of full maturity. None of these decisions required the
child to exercise impulse control in threatening situations, a much
more relevant standard for determining criminal culpability.
Nevertheless, these religious notions continue -to influence both the
law and the manner in which we interpret science. Hence, until re-
cently, many states did not permit children under the age of seven to
be charged with a crime nor did they permit adolescents under the age
of thirteen or fourteen to be tried in an adult criminal court. Al-
though the law was not based on any developmental data, early work
by Piaget seemed to confirm these age frames with research that
demonstrated a large leap in cognitive capacities at age six or seven
and a further jump in ability to master abstract thought around the
71. McNaughton's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
72. Zimring, 527 U.S. at 585.
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age of fourteen. 73 But Piaget, like the religious traditions, focused on
the ability to think and learn, as opposed to the ability to accurately
value risk and consequences or the ability to control strong emotional
impulses like threat. It turns out that the ages of seven and fourteen
are much more likely to predict when a child is ready for elementary
or secondary education than his ability to resist violent impulses.
By now, the ages of six-seven and thirteen-fourteen have become
icons of maturity for many purposes. They even influence how we
interpret new scientific data. For example, when Caufman and Stern-
berg studied adolescent psychosocial skills, they found that only the
top quarter of teens had mastered particular skills by age fourteen. 74
Moreover, they found that most adolescents in the juvenile justice sys-
tem come from the bottom half of teens on any maturity scale. Never-
theless, they recommended age fourteen as the cut-off point for
waiver to adult court. Applying their own data, that would mean that
virtually none of the adolescents waived to adult court would be
psychosocially mature.
The question is whether juveniles are mature enough to make the
necessary choices, or whether their impulse control is sufficiently im-
paired so that they are not fully culpable, especially in conditions of
threat. That question raises constitutional issues. The notion of free
will was imported into the political theory that influenced our consti-
tutional rights. Locke argued that liberty is inherent in human na-
ture.75 In order to justify this view, Locke argued that humans were
born both free and rational. 76 Children were difficult to fit in this
scheme of inherently rational free actors. If children were free and
rational, how could their duty to obey their parents and teachers be
supported? And if children were not free and rational, then when did
freedom and rationality emerge? Locke answered that children were
subject to parental control because they lacked the ability to reason
that would develop with age. Liberty inhered in the human condition
because of the inborn capacity to develop reason, but full liberty did
not arise until reason was fully developed at adulthood.77
But how did reason develop? Surely, not all individuals developed
reasoning abilities identically. Nurture provided a ready answer:
Children developed as a result of the tender care their mothers be-
73. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 68, at 1768.
74. Id. at 1769.
75. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, Two TREATISES]
76. Id.
77. Id.
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stowed on them during crucial developmental stages. Nurture ena-
bled liberals to argue that free will and liberty were inherent, but not
inevitable. Those who lacked appropriate nurture might never fully
develop the necessary reason.
B. Neuroscience: Nature and Nurture
The newest form of this infant determinism cites research from
neuroscience. This brain research comfortably blends nature and nur-
ture into mutually reinforcing systems. The theory is that the geneti-
cally determined biochemistry of the brain responds to external
stimuli. If the stimuli are positive, then the brain develops well and
appropriate behaviors and capacities emerge. If, however, the envi-
ronmental stimuli are absent or negative (as with lead poisoning or
family violence) then the brain does not develop as well. 78 Because
the brain is "plastic," physically formed by the experience it under-
goes, the same infant could develop different brain structures with dif-
ferent biochemical reactions if it is exposed to different environments:
"The structure and function of the developing brain are determined
by how experiences, especially within interpersonal relationships,
shape the genetically programmed maturation of the nervous system.
In other words, human connections shape the neural connections from
which the mind emerges. '79
Infants are born with exponentially more genetic possibilities than
they can use in constructing their brains.8 0 The process of selecting
which genetic material gets incorporated is determined by the envi-
ronment."' Plasticity arises in part because the brain is rapidly form-
ing new connections between cells during the early period between
birth and age two. The space in which these connections occur are
called synapses. Babies are born with approximately the same num-
ber of synapses as adults.8 2 By the time the synaptic density peaks at
about age two, children will have fifty percent greater densities of
synapses than adults. Thereafter, synaptic density declines gradually
until it reaches adult levels in a process called pruning.
One of the most hotly contested debates is what significance to at-
tach to the enormous explosion of synapse formation in the first few
78. See ROBERT H. BLANK, BRAIN POLICY: How THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE WILL CHANGE
OUR LIVES AND OUR PoLIlIcs 33 (1999).
79. DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MINDp: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPER-
SONAL EXPERIENCE 14 (1999).
80. See NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 33-34.
81. See BLANK, supra note 78, at 33.
82. JOHN T. BRUER, THE MYTH OF THE FIRST THREE YEARS 75 (1999).
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years of life. Some argue that this is a critical period of development;
therefore, parents and society should invest large resources at this crit-
ical juncture.83 Implicit in this argument is the notion that the failure
to fully stimulate an infant (with Mozart, mobiles, or Mom) will have
permanent negative consequences, diminishing the child's potential.84
Hence, under this theory, neuroscience leads back to immutability.
Others argue that although a minimal level of stimulation is neces-
sary to trigger normal brain development, extraordinary efforts are
unnecessary.8 5 These scholars suggest that brain development is not
frozen irrevocably at age three, but that it continues throughout life.8 6
The brain continues to change in response to changes in its environ-
ment, so that later experiences often overcome early ones both for
better and worse.8 7 Indeed, there is significant evidence that more
learning occurs during the process of pruning synapses than in the
process of building them.88 Moreover, different areas of the brain are
on different timelines for synapse creation and pruning.89 We know
that the executive function that affects impulse control, the ability to
make sound judgments as to risks, and the ability to juggle multiple
tasks does not develop until much later, and full development is not
complete until adulthood. 90 As John Bruer so colorfully paraphrased,
"[A] lot can happen between [the] high chair and [the] electric
chair." 91 Thus, these scholars read the neuroscience data to limit the
myth of immutability.
III. PASSING THE BLAME
The myth of immutability allocates both responsibility and blame
for child deviance. If children are blank slates, someone is responsible
for filling in the details. Early mistakes belong to the scribe, not the
slate. If, however, children are merely unchangeable genetic acci-
83. See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996); SIEGEL, supra note 79, at
13; STARTING POINTS: MEETING THE NEEDS OF YOUNG CHILDREN (Carnegie Task Force Re-
port, 1994).
84. See SIEGEL, supra note 79, at 13.
85. See generally BRUER, supra note 82, at 29; JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS
(1998); NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 118-25.
86. See BRUER, supra note 82, at 76-80.
87. See id. at 153-54; Ross Thompson, Early Sociopersonality Development, in 3 HANDBOOK
OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 25-104 (William Dumor & Nancy Eisenberg eds., 5th ed. 1998).
88. Thompson, supra note 87, at 74.
89. Id. at 75-76.
90. See, e.g., Sidney J. Segalowitz et al., Cleverness and Wisdom in 12-Year-Olds: Electrophysi-
ological Evidence for Late Maturation of the Frontal Lobe, 8 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 279 (1992).
91. See BRUER, supra note 82, at 58.
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dents, then children themselves must bear the brunt of managing their
imperfect temperaments.
A. Bad Mothers
The myth of immutability has deep cultural roots in the doctrine of
infant determinism that views children as permanently formed by
early experiences.92 Originating in the beginning of the eighteenth
century in Europe, infant determinism supported the doctrine of sepa-
rate spheres by identifying child rearing as the natural biological role
of women, displacing prior employment.93 Together, these doctrines
underscored the essential role of a mother's care for her baby as virtu-
ally shaping the kind of person the child would become. Because a
mother's care for her child was so influential, it gave upper-middle
class women a kind of power that reinforced the role of women as
keepers of the moral future.94 Those women who could devote their
undivided attention to nurturing their children held higher status,
while those forced to work outside the home or who left their children
in care were perceived as "unnatural" or selfish. 95 Consequently, the
poor who were largely comprised of recent immigrants and people of
color quickly became perceived to be inferior mothers who raise unal-
terably defective children.
Infant determinism helped to balance the tension between two com-
peting worldviews: nature versus nurture. Infant determinism carved
out a middle ground, giving room for the influence of mothers but
holding the "incorrigible" child responsible for his behavior once it
had become fixed.
Not surprisingly, most "incorrigible" children turned out to be poor,
immigrants, or people of color. Their mothers were inferior by defini-
tion: they worked outside the home; they left their children in the care
of relatives, older children, or unrelated caretakers; they permitted
their children greater freedom; and they did not instill the proper
''civic virtues."
Thus, the child-savers of a century ago sought to "save" these unfor-
tunate children from their toxic environments (either large cities or
Indian reservations). The mechanisms of salvation are familiar: the
92. See Id. at 29; KAGAN, supra note 85, at 120-22.
93. BRUER, supra note 82, at 29-30; KAGAN, supra note 85, at 122.
94. This role as moral guardians of the culture provided one of the primary motivations for
granting the vote to women. See AILEEN S. KRAcI'TOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT 1890-1920 42-74 (1965); Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents,
82 MINN. L. REv. 1482-83 (1998).
95. BRUER, supra note 82, at 30.
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"orphan" trains that shipped immigrant Catholic children from the
large cities to the West to work on Protestant farms and ranches 96 and
the Indian schools that removed children from their families and con-
sciously tried to force assimilation to white culture by cutting their
hair, banning traditional dress and language, and mixing children of
different tribes. 97
Indeed, assimilation to the dominant culture was both the implicit
and explicit purpose of the progressive movement of child-savers a
century ago. 98 Delinquency was understood as a form of resistance to
mainstream culture. It was not the fault of the poor, innocent children
but of their misguided parents who failed to fulfill their civic duty to
teach their children to be sufficiently obedient to white, middle-class
norms. If parents could not or would not produce compliant children,
the children would be relocated. The juvenile court was simply an-
other mechanism to save these children from their bad parents and
environments. Hence, the model was rehabilitative.
However, these efforts to reconfigure children into the mold of the
mainstream culture were not fully successful. Resistance arose not
only from parents who consistently challenged the definitions of their
children as "orphans" and delinquents, but also from the children
themselves who often failed to be compliant to majoritarian norms
even in the face of relocation. 99 How were the child-savers to explain
such failures? The answer must be that sometimes the damage done
from the early environment was simply too severe to be corrected:
infant determinism. Those who rejected nurture in favor of nature
responded that such failures were inevitable. For determinists, nature
placed a ceiling on the growth that could be expected from nurture.
B. Bad Kids
The old debate between nurture and nature assigned blame differ-
ently. Those who believed nurture was determinative blamed devi-
ance on bad mothers. Those who believed in nature blamed bad kids.
Now those who believe in neuroscience, which emphasizes the inter-
action between nature and nurture, can blame both bad moms and
bad kids. For those caught in the current thrall of "get tough on
96. See generally, e.g., MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN
AMERICA (1992).
97. See, e.g., DAVID H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 107-109, 116 (1993) (describing forced assimilation); PEREA ET AL., supra
note 34, at 862.
98. FELD, supra note 33, at 5, 45 (1999).
99. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 96, at 63 (noting resistance from children who fled their
placements).
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crime," it does not matter whether a youth misbehaves because of
destiny or environment. Either way, he is a bad kid.
Several critiques arise. First, of course, it is unclear what constitutes
a bad kid. Deviance can only be defined as different from some norm
of expected behavior. Thus, in the animal studies on aggression that
have figured so prominently in this research, researchers find that they
need to define "usual aggression."'' 00 They define it as "intrusive on,
rather than part of, the usual social order."'' 1 That definition raises
the issue of whose social order is used: (1) the child's peer group (2)
the dominant majoritarian culture or (3) the ethnic, racial, or neigh-
borhood subculture to which the child belongs. For example, what
constitutes self-defense as a necessary response to a threat may be
defined differently by different groups. A young victim who is rou-
tinely victimized may perceive threats that are invisible to others who
are less familiar with their tormentors. Just as domestic violence vic-
tims learn to watch for the signals of aggression, child victims also
learn to be vigilant. Being street-smart often entails a willingness to
stand up for yourself, rather than back down from a fight. What ap-
pears street-smart, brave, and wise to a youth and his peer group may
be treated as unwarranted aggression by others. Deviance can only be
measured by some set of norms that are almost necessarily rejected by
those labeled as deviant." 2
The researchers recognized the contextual nature of aggression
when they narrowed their definition further to specify that aggression
is excessive if it is unpredictable, disproportionate, and fails to con-
tribute to dominance or social status. 10 3 According to these criteria,
adolescent violence may not be excessive. Predictability is circular.
Teens and others come to expect whatever level of violence becomes
common. For example, high school shootings that would have been
considered unheard of a decade or so ago are now becoming all too
predictable. Mere predictability does not help evaluate what level of
violence is tolerable. Proportionality is not much more helpful, as it is
subject to the same risks of escalation. The amount of violence neces-
sary to protect yourself or your status in a peer group varies with the
amount of force others are using. Hence, we have seen teens graduate
100. Gary W. Kraemer & Susan Clarke, Social Attachment, Brain Function, and Aggression, in
UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 121, 125 (Craig F. Ferris & Thomas
Grisso. eds., 1996).
101. Id.
102. Ken Jacobson, Suggested Theoretical Model for Interventions to Stop Group-based or
Group-motivated Adolescent Aggressive Behavior 360, 362, in UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 121, 125 (Craig F. Ferris & Thomas Grisso, eds. 1996).
103. Kraemer & Clarke, supra note 100, at 125; NIEHOFF, supra note 41, at 76-77.
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from fists to chains to knives to pistols to semi-automatic arsenals.
Finally, adolescents' violence often enhances their social position or
their dominance within the group. It demonstrates their bravery, un-
willingness to tolerate disrespect, power and strength, and indepen-
dence from adult regulation and control.
Adolescence necessarily entails distancing from adult values and
typically involves increased risk-taking and greater emphasis on peer
relationships. 10 4 As teens struggle to differentiate themselves from
their families, they move toward creating their own subcultures of re-
sistance that is often defined by dress, hairstyles, adornment, music,
diet, language, and disobedience. In the context of these subcultures,
adolescents often behave in more antisocial ways than they would on
their own. 105 Indeed, the rates of criminal behavior, ranging from
petty theft to homicide, are very high for all adolescent males, regard-
less of race, ethnicity, or social class. 116 Relatively little of this adoles-
cent crime, however, involves violence to persons. 07 Moreover, most
of this adolescent crime is self-limiting; it does not reflect a life-long
drift toward crime, but will spontaneously stop as the individual ma-
tures. 108 The decisions about which of these rebellious acts should at-
tract official intervention are rife with cultural, racial, ethnic, and class
influences. As a result, deciding which kids are bad kids is
problematic.' 0 9
At one end of the extreme, however, are those juveniles who seri-
ously endanger or kill others. By most measures of deviance, these
acts require some significant intervention. For them, the question is
not so much whether their behavior should trigger a societal response,
but what the response should be. Here, the debate about nature/nur-
ture/neuroscience has real meaning. Those who see these youths as
irretrievably bad kids are pushing toward ever more restrictive and
punitive approaches.
104. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 68. at 1780; Scott & Grisso, supra note 4, at 137.
105. Arja Huttunen, Christina Salmivalli, & Kirsti M.J. Lagerspetz, Friendship Networks and
Bullying in Schools, in UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 354, 358 (Craig
F. Ferris & Thomas Grisso eds., 1996): Jacobson, supra note 102, at 362.
106. Scott & Grisso, supra note 4, at 137.
107. Most juveniles transferred to adult courts are accused of property or drug crimes. DEAN
J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77 (1991); MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISIIERG,
IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 33, fig. 16
(1994);
108. Scott & Grisso, supra note 4, at 172.
109. See, e.g., Jeffrey Blustein, Intervention with Excessively Aggressive Children, in UNDER-
STANDING AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 308, 311-12 (Craig F. Ferris & Thomas Grisso,
eds., 1996).
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
If behavior, violence in particular, is genetically or biologically de-
termined, then it will be extremely difficult to change. It may be func-
tionally immutable. Certainly any efforts to change it will be
extremely costly, both financially and socially. Since we may be una-
ble or unwilling to engage in genetic engineering, suggested solutions
include long prison terms, post-prison incarceration for some offend-
ers,' II and the death penalty. If, however, behavior is partially envi-
ronmentally determined, then rehabilitation is at least theoretically
possible.
A. The Rehabilitative Model
Those who believe in nurture created a juvenile court system based
on a rehabilitative model. Unfortunately, by almost any measure, it
has been a failure. It failed to rehabilitate, operating a system of
youth prisons and courts with inferior procedural protections in-
stead. ' Consequently, studies have indicated that the juvenile delin-
quents who are least likely to become adult criminals are those who
do not get caught." 2
Moreover, the discretionary system of juvenile justice has contrib-
uted to disparate results for girls,' 13 African-Americans, 114 Hispanics,
and the poor.' '5 One mechanism has been findings of incorrigibility.
Juvenile judges are given the power of indeterminate sentencing, os-
tensibly so they can fit the treatment to the individual child's needs.
The consequence is that a judge can incarcerate a child for indefinite
terms up to the age of majority and, sometimes, beyond. This sentenc-
ing discretion has been particularly problematic in findings of incorri-
gibility for repeat offenders. 116 Because poor neighborhoods are
110. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
111. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); FELD, supra note 33, at 245-46.
112. FELD, supra note 33, at 246.
113. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court. An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185,
1276 (1989) (stating, "Even though female juveniles have less extensive prior records and are
involved in less serious types of delinquency than are male offenders, still a larger proportion of
female juveniles are detained.").
114. Id. at 1262 (stating, "[A]fter controlling for present offense and prior record, discretion-
ary individualization may be synonymous with racial discrimination.").
115. Id. at 1263 (stating, "Thomas and Cage conclude that when legal variables are held con-
stant, the juvenile court's individualized justice 'typically applies harsh sanctions to blacks, those
who have dropped out of school, those in single parent or broken homes, [and] those from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds ....').
116. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstructing
the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 299, 313 (1999).
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more closely patrolled and officers are more likely to arrest a black or
Hispanic child than a white child for the same offense, these children
are more likely to have repeat contacts with the system. These repeat
contacts are likely to become grounds for longer and longer sentenc-
ing, out of all proportion to the nature of the offense alleged." 17 Fi-
nally, depending on the region, girls are far more likely to be
incarcerated or detained for status offenses or sexual misbehavior
than boys. 1 8
Incarceration and long pretrial detentions have serious conse-
quences if we believe neuroscientific data that suggests that environ-
mental stimuli affect brain physique and chemistry throughout
adolescence. If so, then incarcerating children who are already at risk
endangers them in both the short and long term. The studies that sug-
gest that contact with the juvenile justice system increases the likeli-
hood of further deviant behavior lend some support to that view.
Indeed, a rehabilitative model can only justify intervention if (1) it is
limited to those who cannot function safely without it and (2) if the
treatment and rehabilitation available in the institution is sufficient to
overcome the negative impact of isolation and loss of stimulation.
Thus, neuroscience buttresses the arguments for mandatory
treatment."19
The treatment model is not entirely benign however. As neuros-
cience holds more sway, neuroscientific responses garner more sup-
porters. These responses vary from increased usage of drugs like
Ritalin for controlling children's hyperactivity to surgical interven-
tions and implants. Given the problematic history of intervention
both for mental patients 20 and outsider groups, this prospect should
cause some concern. First, because outsiders, including persons of
color and the poor, are disproportionately labeled as deviant, they will
be disproportionately labeled as defective or diseased. That stigma
117. These repeat contacts are likely to become grounds for longer and longer sentencing, out
of all proportion to the nature of the offense alleged. Frank Scruggs, Symposium: Report and
Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, 19
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 591, 601 (1992).
118. MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEPTr. OF JUSTICE JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 21-24
(1998).
119. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 116, at 324; Roy G. Spece, Jr., Preserving the Right to
Treatment: a Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treat-
ment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 33-46 (1978).
120. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the forced sterilization of an al-
leged mental incompetent). In fact, the woman forced to be sterilized in Buck v. Bell actually
was the daughter of a prostitute who had born a child out of wedlock. Id. at 207.
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reinforces notions of biological white supremacy.' 21 Second, because
the alleged defect amounts to impaired judgment or loss of free will, it
carries both greater social stigma and has serious political ramifica-
tions. Recall that for liberal political thinkers, liberty is based on the
capacity to rationally exercise free will. Therefore, those who lack ra-
tional free will have no claim to liberty. Hence, one scholar has sug-
gested that the solution for "high-risk" juveniles, like incurable sexual
predators, should be to be preventive detention and treatment. 22 In-
terpreting deviance and resistance to social norms as illness poses seri-
ous risks to outsiders. 23
What to do then with youths who commit serious acts of violence
and are not treatable within the juvenile system, but who pose signifi-
cant risk to themselves or others? The traditional answer was that if
they were not "amenable to treatment," then it might be appropriate
to transfer them to adult court and adult correctional facilities.124 The
juvenile system was only designed for treatment, not punishment. It is
no surprise that most of those who are found to be unamenable to
treatment are blacks or Hispanics. Part of the reason for the disparity
is that wealthier parents who either have better health insurance or
more resources can provide private psychiatric treatment when public
treatment is unavailable. Moreover, when white adolescents are seri-
ously violent, they are typically described as sick, while blacks and
Hispanics are described as predators or gang-bangers. Predators and
gang-bangers need punishment, not treatment.
B. The Punitive Model
The current get tough on crime approach has been to inject more
punishment into the juvenile jails and harsh boot camps, 125 while
sending more and more juveniles over to adult courts to be treated as
121. See, e.g., Blustein, supra note 109, at 308 (noting the cultural contingency of definitions of
conduct disorders and noting the risk such definitions pose to outsider groups).
122. Christopher Slobogin, A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v.
Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 185, 196 (1999).
123. John E. Richters, Disordered Views of Aggressive Children, in UNDERSTAND AcGORES-
SIVE BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 208 (Craig F. Ferris & Thomas Grisso eds., 1996) (classifying ag-
gression as a mental disorder).
124. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
125. Some boot camps are so harsh they have been cited as examples of human rights viola-
tions. Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest that boot camps fail at least as measured by
recidivism rates. See, e.g., Rod Smith, Issues in Juvenile Justice: Toward a More Utilitarian Juve-
nile Court System, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 237, 243 (1999).
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adults.12 6 Proposition 21 in California is just one of a series of state
statutes and initiatives that have shifted juveniles to the adult system.
One of the primary motivations for punishment is deterrence. Al-
though deterrence might sometimes work as a general proposition, it
is arguably less effective with juveniles. 127 Adolescents lack the re-
sponsibility, perspective, impulse control, and judgment that adults
have. 128 They tend to overvalue short-term benefits, undervalue long-
term costs, react more to peer pressure, and foresee fewer conse-
quences of their actions.129 In a word, they have not developed the
executive functions associated with the full development of the frontal
lobe that occurs in late adolescence or early adulthood.130 Hence, de-
terrence and punishment are less effective.
Deterrence also works better the more that an individual has to
lose. Hence, for adolescents who expect a rosy future if they manage
to stay out of trouble, the consequences of a conviction are momen-
tous: It may keep them out of a good college or prevent them from
getting a valuable job. For those who cannot imagine college or high
paying jobs in their future, the risk is smaller. Therefore, to the extent
that deterrence works for adolescents, it is more effective for middle-
class students.
If deterrence fails, then punishment simply becomes retributive. In-
creasingly, victims are demanding retribution as a repayment for the
pain inflicted. However, once again, statistics reveal significant dis-
parities along racial and ethnic lines. As I mentioned earlier, although
blacks account for only 26% of youths arrested, they are 46% of those
waived to adult criminal court. 31 Nothing in the retributive approach
justifies such racially charged results.
The disparate impact is particularly troubling given how harsh the
results are. All too often adult court means adult sentences in adult
correctional facilities. Although adults must be separated from
juveniles in federal correctional facilities, 32 several states continue to
126. See, e.g., Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer
Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 521 (1995); Kirk Heilbrun et al., A
National Survey of U.S. Statutes on Juvenile Transfer: Implications for Policy and Practice, 15
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 125, 128-43 (1997); Jonathan Simon, On Their Own: Delinquency Without
Society, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1001 (1999) (noting that almost two thirds of the states have now
adopted provisions limiting juvenile court jurisdiction).
127. See Slobogin, supra note 116, at 327, 33.
128. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 68, at 1788.
129. Id.
130. Segalowitz, supra note 90, at 279.
131. Butterfield, supra note 36, at Al.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 5039c (1985).
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incarcerate juveniles in adult prisons.' 33 Here, the argument from
neuroscience is even stronger. If adolescent brains are developing
physically and chemically as a result of environmental stimuli, then
adult prison must be one of the worst possible alternatives. It is likely
to be counterproductive both in the present and the future.1 34 Thus,
the more punitive approaches fail to protect society at large.
V. CONCLUSION
The myth of immutability, which states that children are formed
early and cannot be changed, has been with us for hundreds of years.
Unfortunately, we cling to it even in the face of significant scientific
evidence that brains continue to be molded by environmental stimuli
throughout life. Thus, some read the neuroscience literature selec-
tively to reinforce notions of immutability to justify harsh punitive ap-
proaches to youth deviance.
The implicit focus on immutability creates a false dichotomy that
places resistant adolescents in a lose-lose situation: (1) They can claim
to be capable of changing, in which case they have chosen to be "bad"
and should be punished or (2) they can claim that they are incapable
of changing, in which case they should be segregated more or less per-
manently to protect the rest of society. Even when the issue is not
incarceration, the focus on immutability pressures members of diverse
cultures either to prove they can change by assimilating to the
majoritarian norm or admit their lack of capacity that justifies subor-
dinated status. Those children who obey authoritarian patriarchal
structures are rewarded, while those who challenge or resist it are la-
beled incorrigible or worse. 135 It becomes a vehicle to impose hope-
lessness on an entire population from an early age.
133. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§5601-785 (1994).
134. Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile
Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SERI-
OUS. VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238 (James C. Howell et al., eds., 1995)
(noting the higher recidivism rate of juveniles processed through the adult system).
135. This model is consistent with conflict theory that sees criminal justice as enforcing mid-
dle-class values on outsider populations. See FELD, supra note 33, at 75-78.
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